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Air traffic management is regarded as highly innovative and applying modern technology. This is only partly 
true as it suffers from long innovation cycles and other blocking factors.
In the last two decades innovation mechanisms in air traffic management (Eurocontrol, 2011a) changed sig-
nificantly in line with a shift of responsibility from indi-
vidual states governance to a pan-European strategy. In 
1999 the European Commission launched the ‘Single Eu-
ropean Sky’ initiative, as a response to the dramatic growth 
in air travel witnessed over the previous two decades.
e amount of air traffic until the mid-1990s allowed 
for an ad hoc management based on very few planned data 
and position reports. e underlying rule system – derived 
from high safety standards – ensured passenger acceptance 
and supported the airlines’ business models. e safety 
standards also led to long innovation cycles. However the 
system was not very flexible. Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
was and is still regarded worldwide as a sovereign task and, 
as such, is mainly organised by service providers owned 
by the State. e necessary harmonised technical and pro-
cedural standards are defined by the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO), a United Nations organ-
isation. ey have to be approved by each Member State 
individually. As a consequence ATC providers operate dif-
ferent systems and airports regard themselves as individual 
organisms. A couple of other factors hamper broad innova-
tive changes in Air Traffic Management (ATM), including 
market fragmentation and national regulation authority. 
Examples of past ATM innovation
Air traffic increase required a more systematic planning to 
eliminate conflicts on flight routes and to limit the work 
load of controllers and pilots. Research institutes like DLR 
(Deutsches Zentrum fuer Luft- und Raumfahrt, German 
Aerospace center) invented in the 1980s assistance systems 
for ATC controllers. A first version of an arrival 
management system (AMAN), called COMPAS 
(Computer Oriented Metering Planning and Advisory 
System) was implemented in the Frankfurt Approach 
Control by Bundesanstalt für Flugsicherung (BFS), now 
DFS, the German ATC provider (Völckers, 1990). e 
implemented planning algorithms generated a sequence 
and time schedule for the approaching traffic. e logical 
step of reducing air traffic controllers’ task by assisting 
them with planning advisories took several years of 
laboratory research and many consultation iterations with 
users of the technology. Besides the creation of the 
adequate planning algorithms the development of the 
optimal human machine interface was the main challenge 
which finally led to the controllers’ acceptance. ese 
ideas were invented in very few places and were 
implemented into the operations at only 2 or 3 airport 
approach centres at the beginning of the 1990s. It took 
another decade and a lot of additional investment from 
DLR and DFS until the innovative product AMAN 
became available from the industry.
In the community it is now well-known that this prod-
uct is beneficial and that business cases exist for airports 
with a high traffic load. However the market is still lim-
ited, adapting the product to the specific airport and the 
special ATC working arrangements costs a lot of effort, 
such that one can talk of unique products. So the invest-
ment for the ATC provider is high and only a couple of 
companies are offering this AMAN product.
e Instrument Landing System (ILS) allows flight op-
erations even under conditions of bad visibility. In 1989 
DLR recognised that after the landing there were still 
problems in keeping the traffic at the same capacity level 
as in good visibility – even in normal situations aircraft 
taxiing was not always smooth and efficient. is led to 
an airport taxi management concept called the Advanced 
Surface Movement Guidance and Control System or 
A-SMGCS (Dippe, 1990; Klein, 1994a). e four main 
functionalities (i.e., surveillance, planning, guidance, and 
control together with the communication between aircraft 
and ground) were integrated into the system and the pro-
cedures. e refined concept was later on standardised by 
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ICAO in DOC9830 (ICAO, 2004) and was used by tech-
nical harmonisation groups, other research organisations, 
ATC providers, industry and several European projects.
A couple of research projects in several countries as 
well as first installations of some of the mentioned func-
tions pushed the innovation forward. A working group of 
the European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment 
(EUROCAE) played a major role in defining the stan-
dard, balancing the different interests of the manufactur-
ers and end users, and promoting a consistent concept 
for all airports. Not only was the system defined but test 
specifications were given such that installations from vari-
ous manufacturers had to meet certain user requirements.
For the first time a European innovation strategy for 
airport operations was applied in ATM. e European 
Commission sponsored a sequence of big projects within 
the European research framework programmes. All stake-
holders (ATC providers, airports, airlines, manufacturers, 
airframe integrators, universities, and research organisa-
tions) were involved and contributed to the results. Work 
was performed in many European countries and several 
airports hosted complete or components of A-SMGCS. 
ese research activities followed a roadmap to validate 
the concept, the system components and the procedures 
at different sites. e standard could be finalised and 
the market became ready for the innovation. As a result 
a couple of firms were able to mature their products, to 
enter the market and ATC service providers or airports 
got reliable inputs for their investment decisions. As of 
today around 30 airports in the world are equipped with 
A-SMGCS. It is hoped that these systems will significantly 
contribute to airport safety and severe accidents like the 
one in Milano-Linate in October 2001 should be avoided 
in the future.
Higher levels of functionality (automatic guidance, 
etc.) are still under final validation and some standardisa-
tion is still necessary before mature products are installed 
at international airports and in many airlines’ aircraft. is 
concept is built upon several functions and many technol-
ogies and affecting more than only one stakeholder. Even 
with the mentioned improvements in following a strategic 
approach such a complex system required more than 2 
decades and the complete concept is not yet in operation.
More innovation obstacles
When air transportation became popular innovations 
were first applied on board. Technology push and market 
pull changed the aircraft cockpit, the airlines’ business, 
and last not least the pilots’ working environment and 
attitude to use modern technology. e above given 
examples are typical for the situation on ground at the end 
of the last century. e ATM system was built upon the 
situation awareness and on the trained skills of the human 
operator to control the traffic. As long as the performance 
of the air transportation system remained in acceptable 
limits there was no need for more automation and 
fundamental changes. In line with the ATC providers’ set 
up along the countries a national industry existed 
delivering the special products for their national customers.
Europe changes the scene 
e high traffic increase, non-acceptable delays and major 
disruptive events (e.g., 9/11, SARS crisis) affected the air 
transportation system worldwide and led to openly 
questioning the traditional ATM system.
e transportation network in Europe is recognised as 
one of the key factors of prosperity. In 1999 the European 
Union formulated a new goal with the Single European 
Sky as an answer to the deficiencies in air transportation. 
Its primary aims were to meet future capacity and safety 
needs through legislation.
e European ATM system currently handles around 
26,000 flights daily. Forecasts indicate air traffic levels are 
likely to double by 2020. Moreover, the European ATM 
costs an additional €2-3 billion every year, compared to 
other similar systems in the world. is raised serious 
questions as to how the European airspace would accom-
modate increasing air traffic flows whilst cutting costs and 
improving performance.
e answer came with the initiative of organising air-
space into functional blocks, according to traffic flows 
rather than to national borders. Such a project was not 
possible without common rules and procedures at the 
European level. e Single European Sky (SES) was born 
to meet this need (Eurocontrol, 2011b).
Furthermore it was recognised that overcoming the 
organisational fragmentation would not solve the prob-
lem completely. Technical harmonisation and innovations 
were also urgently required. In 2000 a high level group of 
personalities generated the Vision 2020 (ACARE, 2001) 
setting challenging performance targets for the air trans-
port in Europe (in terms of capacity, safety, security, en-
vironment protection, affordability, etc.). e Transport 
Commissioner of the European Commission founded 
the Advisory Council for Aeronautic Research in Europe 
(ACARE) group to work out Strategic Research Agendas 
(SRAs). For the first time all stakeholders of the air trans-
port system worked together to formulate a common 
strategy. 
New instruments in Europe’s research Framework 
Programme (FP7) were used to push research and develop-
ment (R&D) and implement at least partly the aeronau-
tics strategy through Joint Technology Initiatives (JTIs). 
For instance the Clean Sky JTI focuses on the green air 
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transport system – based on adequate fixed wing and ro-
tary wing airframes, engines, and aircraft systems.
e Single European Sky Air Traffic Management 
Research (SESAR) was launched to complement the new 
legislation on the operational side. SESAR represents the 
technological dimension of the SES initiative. It aims to 
develop the new generation ATM system capable of en-
suring safety and fluidity of air transport worldwide over 
the next 30 years. It is composed of three phases (SESAR 
Joint Undertaking, 2011):
•	 e Definition phase (2004-2008) delivered the 
ATM master plan defining the content, the develop-
ment and deployment plans of the next generation 
of ATM systems. Led by Eurocontrol and co-funded 
by the European Commission under the Trans Eu-
ropean Network-Transport (TEN-T) programme it 
was executed by a large consortium of all air transport 
stakeholders;
•	 e Development phase (2008-2013) will produce 
the required new generation of technological systems, 
components and operational procedures as defined in 
the SESAR ATM Master Plan and Work Programme;
•	 e Deployment phase (2014-2020) will see the large 
scale production and implementation of the new 
ATM infrastructure, composed of fully harmonised 
and interoperable components guaranteeing high 
performance air transport activities in Europe.
ATM innovation management by SESAR 
Not surprisingly the first phase resulted in a debate on 
how much innovation should be planned in the short and 
medium term part of the roadmap. Airlines were 
particularly interested in speeding up the R&D and 
making the best use of the already installed technology in 
the airframes. ATC providers were reluctant to follow as 
they are facing the biggest investments and organisational 
changes. e tight schedule of this phase led to a master 
plan building upon mature technologies. 
In the researchers’ view SESAR is implementing old 
ideas already elaborated by research in the 1990s. SESAR 
is more about development than research. It is nonetheless 
a big step forward as all stakeholders were involved and 
finally agreed to follow the SESAR path. Due to time pres-
sure in the definition phase some unfilled gaps led the new 
ATM concept to remain incomplete and inconsistent.
e development phase is managed by the SESAR 
Joint Undertaking (SJU), a public private partnership or-
ganisation. It is financed partly through FP7, partly by 
the TEN-T programme, Eurocontrol and the industry. 
In addition to the SJU founding members, the European 
Commission and Eurocontrol, 15 companies (or industri-
al consortia) became full members and are executing about 
300 projects. e SJU administration board is composed 
of these members together with representatives of the air 
space users (e.g., airlines, air forces), of the staff (e.g., con-
troller organisations), of the research community, etc. Full 
members of the SJU are airborne and ground equipment 
manufacturers, an airport group, ATC providers, and an 
airframe integrator. Many other organisations (e.g., air-
lines, other ATC providers, research labs, small and big 
industrial companies) are involved via sub-contracts or via 
affiliation to members.
e work programme (content of the projects) was 
created through a bottom-up process in which all member 
candidates contributed with their ideas. Within one work 
package the SJU, with the help of Eurocontrol and some 
members, had then to structure the work and compose the 
overall system fitting into the master plan concept frame. 
Risks like leaving gaps open, not fitting interfaces and de-
lays seem to be unavoidable.  
Joining forces will improve the innovation process. 
However in the SESAR management real independent 
parties are the minority. Because for example public fund-
ed organisations (research labs, universities, non-profit en-
tities, etc.) are not yet affiliated with the SJU level directly. 
e complex system is mainly designed by combining 
contributions from interested parties in order to ensure 
the buy-in of the main stakeholders.
Some other deficiencies of this approach have to be 
overcome to speed up and stabilise the innovation process 
and to shift paradigms in ATM where necessary. e cre-
ation of new organisations like the SJU, a new financing 
scheme and the new way of working together delayed the 
innovation process by several years. Furthermore success-
ful working structures at the European level (e.g., integrat-
ed projects in the research framework) were dismantled. 
Many research units (research labs, universities, research 
departments of ATC providers) lost a big part of their 
funding and by that some creativity. Partly a brain drain 
took place as young scientists went to other disciplines or 
had no chance to join European ATM projects.
Conclusion
Air Traffic Management developed in the last century at 
different speeds on board and on the ground. 
Fragmentation throughout the industry and sovereign 
interests prevented the system from becoming efficient 
and cost effective.
e limitations discovered at the end of the century (de-
lays, costs, noise, pollution, etc.) led to innovation in some 
system parts and regions. At the beginning of the 1990s 
the European Union took action and formulated goals for 
the air transport system and for the future ATM system. 
A strategic approach was implemented and the innovation 
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management was reorganised by initiating SESAR. is 
process can be regarded as a quantum leap as it involves 
all stakeholders and leads to an innovation process on a 
pan-European scale. Some concerns nonetheless remain as 
to the risks of the chosen approach and the side effect of 
financially drying out the ATM research scene. ere is 
still a need for a variety of other means to enable creativ-
ity, financial support and implementation strategies.  
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